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Abstract 
Two great problems of learning confront humanity: (1) learning about the universe, and 
about ourselves as a part of the universe, and (2) learning how to make progress 
towards as good a world as possible.  We solved the first problem when we created 
modern science in the 17th century, but we have not yet solved the second problem.  
This puts us in a situation of unprecedented danger.  Modern science and technology 
enormously increase our power to act, but not our power to act wisely.  All our current 
global crises have arisen as a result.  What we need to do is learn from our solution to 
the first great problem of learning how to go about solving the second one.  Properly 
implemented, this idea leads to a new kind of inquiry rationally devoted to helping 
humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible. 
 
Introduction 
Two great problems of learning confront humanity: (1) learning about the universe, and 
about ourselves and other living things as a part of the universe, and (2) learning how to 
make progress towards as good a world as possible.  We solved the first problem in the 
17th century when we created modern science.  That is not to say that we know 
everything that there is to be known, but rather, that we have discovered a method which 
enables us progressively to improve our knowledge and understanding – the empirical 
method of science.  But we have not yet solved the second problem.  And that 
combination of solving the first problem and failing to solve the second one puts us in a 
situation of unprecedented danger.  For, increasing our scientific knowledge and 
technological know-how enormously increases our power to act.  Often, of course, this 
has magnificent outcomes.  Modern science and technology have made the modern 
world possible, with all its immense benefits.  But, in the absence of the solution to the 
second problem, our enhanced powers to act have also led to all our current global 
crises: global warming, explosive population growth, destruction of natural habitats and 
rapid extinction of species, depletion of finite natural resources, vast inequalities of 
wealth and power around the globe, pollution of earth, sea and air, the lethal character of 
modern war, the menace of modern armaments, even the Aids epidemic (Aids being 
spread by modern travel).  All these have come about, paradoxically, because of our 
successes, our enhanced powers to act bequeathed to us by modern science and 
technology, via modern industry, agriculture, medicine, hygiene, transport, and the 
technology of war.  They have come about because of our immensely increased powers 
to act without an accompanying increase in our power to act wisely.  
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Many blame science for our problems.  But that is entirely to miss the point.  What we 
need to do, rather, is learn from our solution to the first great problem of learning how to 
go about solving the second problem.  We need to learn from scientific progress how to 
achieve social progress towards a good world. 
 
The Enlightenment 
This was the basic idea of the 18th century Enlightenment, especially the French 
Enlightenment.1  Unfortunately, in developing this profoundly important idea, the 
philosophes of the Enlightenment made a series of blunders, and it is the defective 
version of the Enlightenment Programme which emerged as a result, that we built into 
the institutions of academia in the early 20th century when we created departments and 
disciplines of social science.   The outcome is a kind of inquiry devoted, in the first 
instance, to the acquisition of knowledge – knowledge-inquiry as I shall call it.  This holds 
that, first, knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help solve 
social problems.  It is this that we are still suffering from today.2 
In order to implement properly the profound Enlightenment idea of learning from the 
solution to the first great problem of learning how to go about solving the second one, 
there are three crucial steps that we need to get right. 
 
1.  The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified. 
2.  These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully 
     applicable to any worthwhile, problematic human endeavour, whatever its aims 
     may be, and not just applicable to the endeavour of improving knowledge. 
3.  These correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited 
     correctly in the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards      
as good a world as possible. 
 
Unfortunately, the philosophes got all three steps wrong.  They misconstrued the nature 
of the progress-achieving methods of natural science; they failed to generalize the 
methods of science properly; and, most disastrously of all, they made the entirely wrong 
application of these methods.  They applied these methods to developing social science, 
to the task of improving knowledge of the social world, whereas they ought to have 
applied the properly generalized progress-achieving methods of science directly to social 
life, to the social world itself.  Instead of seeking to make social progress towards an 
enlightened world, the philosophes ended up seeking to make no more than intellectual 
progress in knowledge about the social world. 
Academic inquiry as it exists by and large today – knowledge-inquiry – still embodies 
these ancient blunders.  As a result, academia as we have it today is a botched attempt 
to create institutions of learning designed to help us solve the second great problem of 
learning.  In order to create what we so urgently need, a kind of inquiry rationally 
designed to help us make progress towards as good a world as possible, we need to 
modify academia as it exists today just sufficiently to correct the three blunders we have 
inherited from the past.  The outcome would be a new kind of academic enterprise that I 
shall call wisdom-inquiry.  Wisdom-inquiry is designed to enable us to learn from our 
solution to the first great problem of learning how to go about solving the second 
problem.  Here is what we need to do to create wisdom-inquiry. 
 
Correcting the first Blunder: Scientific Method 
First, we need to correct current orthodox ideas about the nature of the progress-
achieving methods of science.  From D’Alembert in the 18th century to Karl Popper in the 
20th, the widely held view, amongst both scientists and philosophers, has been (and 
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continues to be) that science proceeds by assessing theories impartially in the light of 
evidence, no permanent assumption being accepted by science about the universe 
independently of evidence.3   Preference may be given to simple, unified or explanatory 
theories, but not in such a way that nature herself is, in effect, assumed to be simple, 
unified or comprehensible. 
This orthodox view, which may be called standard empiricism is, however, untenable.  If 
taken literally, it would instantly bring science to a standstill. For, given any accepted 
fundamental theory of physics, T,  Newtonian theory say, or quantum theory, endlessly 
many empirically more successful rivals can be concocted which agree with T about 
observed phenomena but disagree arbitrarily about some unobserved phenomena, and 
successfully predict phenomena, in an ad hoc way, that T makes false predictions about, 
or no predictions.  Physics would be drowned in an ocean of such empirically more 
successful rival theories.4 
In practice, these rivals are excluded because they are disastrously disunified.  Two 
considerations govern acceptance of theories in physics: empirical success and unity.  In 
demanding unity, we demand of a fundamental physical theory that it ascribes the same 
dynamical laws to the phenomena to which the theory applies.5  But in persistently 
accepting unified theories, to the extent of rejecting disunified rivals that are just as, or 
even more, empirically successful, physics makes a big persistent assumption about the 
universe.  The universe is such that all disunified theories are false.  It has some kind of 
unified dynamic structure.  It is physically comprehensible in the sense that explanations 
for phenomena exist to be discovered.6 
But this untestable (and thus metaphysical) assumption that the universe is physically 
comprehensible is profoundly problematic.  Science is obliged to assume, but does not 
know, that the universe is comprehensible.  Much less does it know that the universe is 
comprehensible in this or that way.  A glance at the history of physics reveals that ideas 
have changed dramatically over time.  In the 17th century there was the idea that the 
universe consists of corpuscles, minute billiard balls, which interact only by contact.  This 
gave way to the idea that the universe consists of point-particles surrounded by rigid, 
spherically symmetrical fields of force, which in turn gave way to the idea that there is 
one unified self-interacting field, varying smoothly throughout space and time.  
Nowadays we have the idea that everything is made up of minute quantum strings 
embedded in ten or eleven dimensions of space-time.  Some kind of assumption along 
these lines must be made but, given the historical record, and given that any such 
assumption concerns the ultimate nature of the universe, that of which we are most 
ignorant, it is only reasonable to conclude that it is almost bound to be false. 
The way to overcome this fundamental dilemma inherent in the scientific enterprise is to 
construe physics as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the 
comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting less and 
less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming more and more likely to be true, 
and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, 
to be possible at all.  In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, 
fixed assumptions and associated methods is created within which much more 
substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods can be changed, and 
indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves.  Put another way, a framework of 
relatively unspecific, unproblematic, fixed aims and methods is created within which 
much more specific and problematic aims and methods evolve as scientific knowledge 
evolves.  There is positive feedback between improving knowledge, and improving aims-
and-methods, improving knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge.  This is the nub 
of scientific rationality,  
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Figure 1: Aim-Oriented Empiricism 
the methodological key to the unprecedented success of science.  Science adapts its 
nature to what it discovers about the nature of the universe.6 
This hierarchical conception of physics, which may be called aim-oriented empiricism, is 
depicted in Figure 1.  At level 7, there is the assumption that the universe is such that we 
can acquire some knowledge of our local circumstances.  If this minimal assumption is 
false, we have had it whatever we assume.  It can never be in our interests to abandon 
this assumption.  At level 6 we have the more substantial and risky assumption that the 
universe is such that we can learn how to improve methods for improving knowledge.  
This promises to be too fruitful for progress in knowledge not to be accepted.  At level 5 
there is the assumption that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other – it  
being such that something exists which provides in principle one kind of explanation for 
all phenomena.  At level 4 there is the even more substantial assumption that the 
universe is physically comprehensible, there being some kind of invariant physical entity, 
pervading all phenomena which (together with instantaneous states of affairs) 
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determines (perhaps probabilistically) how events unfold in space and time.  The 
universe is such, in other words, that the true physical “theory of everything” is unified, or 
physically comprehensible.  At level 3 there is the even more substantial assumption that 
the universe is physically comprehensible in some more or less specific way.  
Superstring theory, or M-theory, might be this assumption today.  At level 2 we have 
currently accepted fundamental theories of physics: at present, the standard model, and 
general relativity.  At level 1 we have accepted empirical data. 
As we descend this hierarchy, we go from an assumption at the top almost certain to be 
true to an assumption, at level 3, that is almost bound to be false.  The hope is that we 
can keep falsity confined to assumptions as low down in the hierarchy as possible.  The 
idea is to concentrate criticism where it is most likely to be fruitful – low down in the 
hierarchy.  We need to try to modify ideas here, so that they are compatible with 
assumptions higher up in the hierarchy, and at the same time accord best with empirical 
progress at levels 1 and 2 – or promise to promote empirically progressive research 
programmes at these levels.7 
Thus physics seeks, not truth per se, but rather truth presupposed to be explanatory.  
But science does not just seek explanatory truth; more generally, it seeks valuable truth 
– if anything, even more problematic.  And it seeks truth to be used by people, and by 
institutions, in one way or another, if anything even more problematic.  There are, in 
short, highly problematic assumptions concerning metaphysics, values, and human use 
implicit in the aims and priorities of scientific research.  These need to be made explicit 
within science, and subjected to sustained imaginative and critical scrutiny, by scientists 
and non-scientists alike, in an attempt to improve aims so that they come to represent 
the best interests of humanity.8  The aim-oriented empiricist conception of the methods 
of physics depicted in figure 1 can readily be generalized to take into account 
problematic assumptions associated with the aims of science having to do with values, 
and the social uses or applications of science.  It can be generalized so as to apply to 
the different branches of natural science.  Different sciences have different specific aims, 
and so different specific methods although, throughout natural science there is the 
common meta-methodology of aim-oriented empiricism.9 
So much for the first blunder of the traditional Enlightenment, and how to put it right.  It is 
important to correct this blunder, not only for science, but also because it is only when 
this has been done that scientific method becomes especially helpful, indeed vitally 
necessary – when generalized – in enabling us to make progress towards as good a 
world as possible, as we shall see. 
 
Correcting the Second Blunder: Generalizing Scientific Method 
The second step involves generalizing the progress-achieving meta-methods of science, 
just indicated, so that they become fruitfully applicable, potentially, to all worthwhile, 
problematic human endeavours.  Whatever we are doing, our aims may well be 
problematic, because they are (more or less) unrealisable, undesirable, or both.  When 
this is likely to be the case we need to represent our aim in the form of a hierarchy, aims 
becoming less and less specific, and so less and less problematic, as we go up the 
hierarchy.  In this way, we create a framework of relatively unproblematic aims and 
methods, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more specific and problematic 
aims and methods may be imaginatively and critically assessed, in the light of 
experience, what we enjoy and suffer, as we act, and in the light of less problematic 
aims higher up in the hierarchy.  This hierarchical meta-methodology – aim-oriented 
rationality - arrived at by generalizing the hierarchical progress-achieving methods of 
aim-oriented empiricism depicted in figure 1, enables us to improve social policies, ideas 
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for living, philosophies of life, in the light of experience, much as science improves 
knowledge.10 
 
Correcting the Third Blunder: From Social Science to Wisdom-Inquiry 
The third step corrects by far the biggest and most serious blunder we have inherited 
from the Enlightenment.  It involves applying aim-oriented rationality (arrived at by 
generalizing aim-oriented empiricism, the progress-achieving methods of science), not to 
social science, not to the task of improving knowledge of social phenomena, but directly 
to social life, to the task of improving the social world.  The social sciences and 
humanities need to be transformed so that they take up the task of helping humanity get 
into individual, institutional, social and global life the aim-improving, hierarchical 
methodology of aim-oriented rationality.  Properly implemented, in short, the 
Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress 
towards an enlightened world involves developing social inquiry, not primarily as social 
science, but rather as social methodology, or social philosophy.  The basic task of social 
inquiry and the humanities would be to help people tackle problems of living in 
increasingly cooperatively rational ways so that what is of value in life may be attained.  
Somewhat as natural science, in the pursuit of knowledge, proposes and attempts to 
falsify conjectured solutions to problems of knowledge, so social inquiry and the 
humanities, in order to help people achieve what is of value in life, would propose and 
critically assess conjectured solutions to problems of living - possible social actions, 
policies, political programmes, new social arrangements and institutions, ways of living, 
philosophies of life.  Social inquiry and the humanities would have the task too, of 
course, of actively promoting cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living in the 
social world.  And again, somewhat as natural science ought to put aim-oriented 
empiricism into scientific practice, so too a basic task of social inquiry and the humanities 
would be to get into personal and social life, and into other institutions besides that of 
science – into government, industry, agriculture, commerce, the media, law, education, 
international relations – the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality 
(designed to improve problematic aims) arrived at by generalizing the methods of 
science.11  
It is just this that the philosophes failed to do.  Instead of applying aim-oriented rationality 
to social life, the philosophes sought to apply a seriously defective conception of 
scientific method to social science, to the task of making progress towards, not a better 
world, but better knowledge of social phenomena.  And this ancient blunder, developed 
throughout the 19th century by J.S. Mill, Karl Marx and many others, and built into 
academia in the early 20th century with the creation of the diverse branches of the social 
sciences in universities all over the world, is still built into the institutional and intellectual 
structure of academia today, inherent in the current character of social science.12 
The upshot of correcting the three blunders of the Enlightenment would be a revolution 
in academia.  Instead of academia being devoted, in the first instance, to the pursuit of 
knowledge - knowledge-inquiry as I have called it - we would have a new kind of 
academic enterprise devoted to the pursuit of wisdom - wisdom-inquiry as I have called 
it.  Wisdom is to be understood here as the capacity and the active endeavour to realize 
what is of value in life, for oneself and others ("realize" meaning both "apprehend" and 
"make real" or "create"), wisdom in this sense including knowledge, technological know-
how and understanding, but much else besides.  Wisdom-inquiry puts problems of living 
at the heart of the academic enterprise.  It strives to help humanity tackle problems of 
living - especially grave global problems indicated above - in increasingly cooperatively 
rational ways, and strives, too, to help humanity put aim-oriented rationality into practice 
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in its diverse endeavours, above all the endeavour to make progress towards as good a 
world as possible.   
 
Adverse Consequences 
So far, we have failed to correct the three blunders of the Enlightenment.  We have 
failed to transform knowledge-inquiry so that it becomes wisdom-inquiry.  We have failed 
to get the aim-improving meta-methodology of aim-oriented rationality into the fabric of 
social life, into our diverse institutions and social endeavours.  Even worse, we have not 
as yet had the idea that this urgently needs to be done.  The idea has been around for 
decades, but it has been ignored.   
The consequences of these blunders have been dire indeed.  Almost all our current 
global crises have arisen because we have successfully pursued aims that seemed 
inherently desirable but which have subsequently turned out to have adverse 
repercussions.  We strive to achieve progress – economic, industrial, social – and, as a 
result, along with much that is good, we bring about global warming, pollution, depletion 
of natural resources.  We strive to cure and prevent disease, and usher in rapid 
population growth.  We promote modern agriculture, and destroy natural habitats and 
bring about the extinction of species.  We pursue wealth, and plunge the world into debt.  
We seek security, build up our armies and armaments in defence, prompt others to do 
likewise, and provoke war.  Traditional ideas about what constitutes a good world and 
how to achieve it, from both right and left, have had such damaging consequences when 
attempts have been made to put them into practice that the whole idea of making 
progress towards a good world has become discredited. 
In order to avoid these adverse consequences of our actions it is vital that we put aim-
oriented rationality into practice so that we may discover unsuspected drawbacks in the 
aims we pursue early on, and so that we may develop social and political muscle able to 
modify our aims, our actions, in the light of what we discover.  It is this that we have 
singularly failed to do.  Indeed, we have not even seen the need to make the attempt.  
Current conceptions of rationality, from Bayesianism to critical rationalism, fail to stress 
the vital need to improve aims as we act.  Social inquiry, instead of actively helping 
humanity build aim-oriented rationality into social life, has instead concentrated on 
acquiring knowledge of social phenomena. 
It is above all when we come to the immense, and profoundly problematic enterprise of 
making social progress towards an enlightened, wise world that it is vital to put aim-
oriented rationality into practice.  The aim of such an enterprise is notoriously 
problematic.  For all sorts of reasons, what constitutes a good world, an enlightened, 
wise or civilized world, attainable and genuinely desirable, must be inherently and 
permanently problematic.  Only the effective social and political implementation of aim-
oriented rationality could hope to empower us to make progress towards such a highly  
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Figure 2: Aim-Oriented Rationality Applied to Creating Civilization  
 
problematic goal as a genuinely good world.  Figure 2, formally analogous to 
Figure 1, indicates what might be involved.  
Our failure to correct the three blunders we have inherited from the 
Enlightenment has meant that we have failed to exploit – even recognize – the 
full resources of the progress-achieving methods of science which, when 
generalized, promise to provide the vital assistance we need in order to make 
social progress towards a genuinely civilized, enlightened world.  Aim-oriented 
rationality is not sufficient; but it is necessary. 
 
Technology and Practical Wisdom 
Once upon a time, technological discovery and development seemed to be the 
key to progress towards a better world.  Medical technology enhanced health and 
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longevity; agricultural technology vastly increased production of food; technology 
in transport, communications, power production, architecture, entertainment, and 
indeed in every aspect of life, enhanced the quality of life in a multitude of ways. 
But in the last few decades, as we have seen, a darker side to all this 
technological and human progress has become all too apparent.  Modern 
medicine and hygiene have led to the population explosion; there may be as 
many as 11 billion people on earth by the end of this century, many more than 
our planet can comfortably sustain.  Technologically-enhanced modern 
agriculture has just about kept pace with the growing human population, but at 
the expense of the natural world.  It has led to the destruction of tropical rain 
forests and other natural habitats, and the rapid extinction of species.  We are 
living in an age of mass extinction of unprecedented rapidity, caused by us.  
There is the technology of war, which has vastly increased our power to maim 
and kill - to the extent that we now even have the power to destroy our world by 
means of nuclear war.  Something like 12 million people were killed in wars in the 
19th century, whereas in the 20th century over 100 million people died as a result 
of war - and we are not doing too well in the 21st century so far.  Once upon a 
time we relied on spears and arrows; now we have the technology of 
conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological armaments.  Perhaps most 
serious of all, there are the impending disasters of climate change, engendered 
by the technology of power production and transport that pumps carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere (aided by aspects of agriculture and forest destruction).  
These global problems impact on and intensify each other.  Population growth 
intensifies problems of food production just at a time when climate change 
sabotages agriculture; as vast areas of the earth, in north Africa, Asia and 
elsewhere, become uninhabitable, those who have lived there will try to flee to 
neighbouring lands, already under stress, and will be repulsed - just the 
conditions for war. 
The root of the problem is the one I have already identified.  We once thought - 
and our universities are organized as if we still think - that the key to human 
progress consisted in this: first, we need to acquire scientific knowledge and 
technological know-how; then, secondarily, this knowledge and know-how can be 
applied to help solve social problems.  But this traditional procedure, inherited 
from the Enlightenment, is an intellectual disaster, and a recipe for human 
disasters - as our modern world reveals all too clearly.  If our concern is to make 
progress towards as good a world as possible, then the problems that 
fundamentally need our attention and concern are, not problems of knowledge or 
technology, but our problems of living - problems we encounter as we live our 
lives, and problems we, and our children, will encounter in the future if we go on 
as we are. present trends continue.  Problems of living are resolved by what we 
do, or what we refrain from doing.  Even when new knowledge and technology 
are required - as they are in connection with medicine and agriculture for 
example - it is always what this knowledge and technology enables us to do, or 
refrain from doing, that solves the problem, not the knowledge and technology in 
itself.   
At the heart of our thinking, whether in life or in universities, we need to put our 
problems of living and what we need to do about them, at all levels, from the 
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personal, the social, the institutional, to the international and global.  We need to 
develop in our culture, our social world, traditions of serious, imaginative, critical 
exploration of what our problems are, and what we might do about them.  We 
need to try to transform our social world so that it comes to encourage and 
facilitate cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living.  Schools and 
Universities need to engage with, and need to promote, such cooperatively 
rational tackling of problems of  living.  And we, the public, need to do this too.  
Technology without practical wisdom can be, as we have seen, a menace. 
There is, however, a gulf between the problems of living we encounter at the 
personal level as we live our lives, and the problems of living encountered by 
humanity as a whole - our global problems indicated above.  Individually we 
strive to earn a living, find love, bring up children, achieve success - or perhaps 
just get enough to eat from day to day.  We may be aware of looming global 
crises: rapid population growth, climate change, devastating loss of natural 
habitats, disappearance of wild animals and species, wars, tyrannies, pollution of 
earth, sea and air.  Some of us of course, are more aware of these global 
problems than others.  These global crises arise, of course, as a result of the 
combined actions of humanity.  And yet, as far as most of us are concerned, our 
personal contribution to the creation, maintenance or intensification of these 
global problems is minute.  There is this massive disconnect between the global 
problems that confront humanity, and the personal problems that confront each 
one of us in our personal lives. 
This is, above all, why we so urgently need to bring wisdom-inquiry into 
existence.  It would be a primary task of wisdom-inquiry to help us bridge the gulf 
that exists at present between our personal problems of living, and our common 
global problems confronting all of us together, humanity as a whole.  A basic task 
of wisdom-inquiry would be to help us discover how we can act with others to get 
the powers that be - governments, multi-nationals, industry, banks, economic 
systems, media outlets - so to change their ways that we all begin to do what 
needs to be done to begin to resolve the immense and grave problems that 
confront us all.  We need wisdom-inquiry to help us discover how we can begin to 
take charge of our future intelligently, rationally, humanely - that is, wisely. 
The crises we face have been made possible by the astonishing successes of 
modern science and technological research.  This prompts some to condemn 
science and technology.  We have seen, however, that this is the wrong thing to 
do.  We need to learn from our immense success in solving the first great 
problem of learning how to go about solving the second problem.  The methods 
employed in solving the first problem - that is, the progress-achieving methods of 
natural science - when properly understood, properly generalized and, above all, 
properly implemented, become profoundly relevant to resolving those problems 
of living, from the personal to the global, that we need to solve in order to make 
progress towards an enlightened, civilized world.  The methods of science hold 
the key to the practical wisdom we need to acquire to create global civilization.  
 
Conclusion 
The upshot of correcting the three Enlightenment blunders, still built into the 
intellectual/institutional structure of academia today, is a new kind of inquiry – 
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wisdom-inquiry – rationally organized and devoted to help us solve the second 
great problem of learning, make progress towards as good a world as possible.  
The scientific task of improving knowledge and understanding of nature becomes 
a part of the broader task of improving global wisdom – wisdom being the 
capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus 
including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides (realize 
meaning both “apprehend” or “experience”, and “make real” or “create”). 
Universities as at present constituted betray both reason and humanity.  We 
urgently need to bring about a revolution in our universities and other institutions 
of learning so that they take up the task of helping us solve the second great 
problem of learning, make progress towards a better, wiser world. 
 
What Needs to be Done to Transform Knowledge-Inquiry into Wisdom-
Inquiry 
1.  There needs to be a change in the basic intellectual aim of inquiry, from the 
growth of knowledge to the growth of wisdom — wisdom being taken to be the 
capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, and thus 
including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how (but much else 
besides). 
2.  There needs to be a change in the nature of academic problems, so that 
problems of living are included, as well as problems of knowledge – the former 
being treated as intellectually more fundamental than the latter.  
3.  There needs to be a change in the nature of academic ideas, so that 
proposals for action are included as well as claims to knowledge – the former, 
again, being treated as intellectually more fundamental than the latter. 
4.  There needs to be a change in what constitutes intellectual progress, so 
that progress-in-ideas-relevant-to-achieving-a-more-civilized-world is included as 
well as progress in knowledge, the former being indeed intellectually 
fundamental. 
5.  There needs to be a change in the idea as to where inquiry, at its most 
fundamental, is located.  It is not esoteric theoretical physics, but rather the 
thinking we engage in as we seek to achieve what is of value in life.  Academic 
thought is a (vital) adjunct to what really matters, personal and social thought 
active in life. 
6.  There needs to be a dramatic change in the nature of social inquiry 
(reflecting points 1 to 5).  Economics, politics, sociology, and so on, are not, 
fundamentally, sciences, and do not, fundamentally, have the task of improving 
knowledge about social phenomena.  Instead, their task is threefold.  First, it is to 
articulate problems of living, and propose and critically assess possible solutions, 
possible actions or policies, from the standpoint of their capacity, if implemented, 
to promote wiser ways of living.  Second, it is to promote such cooperatively 
rational tackling of problems of living throughout the social world.  And third, at a 
more basic and long-term level, it is to help build the hierarchical structure of 
aims and methods of aim-oriented rationality into personal, institutional and 
global life, thus creating frameworks within which progressive improvement of 
personal and social life aims-and-methods becomes possible.  These three tasks 
are undertaken in order to promote cooperative tackling of problems of living — 
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but also in order to enhance empathic or “personalistic” understanding between 
people as something of value in its own right.  Acquiring knowledge of social 
phenomena is a vital but subordinate activity, engaged in to facilitate the above 
three fundamental pursuits. 
7.  Natural science needs to change, so that it includes at least three levels of 
discussion: evidence, theory, and research aims.  Discussion of aims needs to 
bring together scientific, metaphysical and evaluative consideration in an attempt 
to discover the most desirable and realizable research aims.  It needs to 
influence, and be influenced by, exploration of problems of living undertaken by 
social inquiry and the humanities, and the public. 
8.  There needs to be a dramatic change in the relationship between social 
inquiry and natural science, so that social inquiry becomes intellectually more 
fundamental from the standpoint of tackling problems of living, promoting 
wisdom.  Social inquiry influences choice of research aims for the natural and 
technological sciences, and is, of course, in turn influenced by the results of such 
research.  (Social inquiry also, of course, conducts empirical research, in order to 
improve our understanding of what our problems of living are, and in order to 
assess policy ideas whenever possible.) 
9.  The current emphasis on specialized research needs to change so that 
sustained discussion and tackling of broad, global problems that cut across 
academic specialities is included, both influencing and being influenced by, 
specialized research. 
10. Academia needs to include sustained imaginative and critical exploration of 
possible futures, for each country, and for humanity as a whole, policy and 
research implications being discussed as well. 
11.  The way in which academic inquiry as a whole is related to the rest of the 
human world needs to change dramatically.  Instead of being intellectually 
dissociated from the rest of society, academic inquiry needs to be communicating 
with, learning from, teaching and arguing with the rest of society — in such a way 
as to promote cooperative rationality and social wisdom.  Academia needs to 
have just sufficient power to retain its independence from the pressures of 
government, industry, the military, and public opinion, but no more.  Academia 
becomes a kind of civil service for the public, doing openly and independently 
what actual civil services are supposed to do in secret for governments.   
12. There needs to be a change in the role that political and religious ideas, 
works of art, expressions of feelings, desires and values have within rational 
inquiry.  Instead of being excluded, they need to be explicitly included and 
critically assessed, as possible indications and revelations of what is of value, 
and as unmasking of fraudulent values in satire and parody, vital ingredients of 
wisdom. 
13. There need to be changes in education so that, for example, seminars 
devoted to the cooperative, imaginative and critical discussion of problems of 
living are at the heart of all education from five-year-olds onwards.  Politics, 
which cannot be taught by knowledge-inquiry, becomes central to wisdom-
inquiry, political creeds and actions being subjected to imaginative and critical 
scrutiny.   
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14. There need to be changes in the aims, priorities and character of pure 
science and scholarship, so that it is the curiosity, the seeing and searching, the 
knowing and understanding of individual persons that ultimately matters, the 
more impersonal, esoteric, purely intellectual aspects of science and scholarship 
being means to this end.  Social inquiry needs to give intellectual priority to 
helping empathic understanding between people to flourish (as indicated in 6 
above). 
15. There need to be changes in the way mathematics is understood, pursued 
and taught.  Mathematics is not a branch of knowledge at all.  Rather, it is 
concerned to explore problematic possibilities, and to develop, systematize and 
unify problem-solving methods. 
16. Literature needs to be put close to the heart of rational inquiry, in that it 
explores imaginatively our most profound problems of living and aids 
personalistic understanding in life by enhancing our ability to enter imaginatively 
into the problems and lives of others. 
17 Philosophy needs to change so that it ceases to be just another specialized 
discipline and becomes instead that aspect of inquiry as a whole that is 
concerned with our most general and fundamental problems — those problems 
that cut across all disciplinary boundaries.  Philosophy needs to become again 
what it was for Socrates: the attempt to devote reason to the growth of wisdom in 
life. 
18 Academic contributions need to be written in as simple, lucid, jargon-free a 
way as possible, so that academic work is as accessible as possible across 
specialities and to non-academics. 
19. There needs to be a change in views about what constitute academic 
contributions, so that publications which promote (or have the potential to 
promote) public understanding as to what our problems of livings are and what 
we need to do about them are included, in addition to contributions addressed 
primarily to the academic community. 
 
In addition, the following four institutional innovations ought also to be made 
to help wisdom-inquiry to flourish: 
 
20. Natural science needs to create committees, in the public eye, and manned 
by scientists and non-scientists alike, concerned to highlight and discuss failures 
of the priorities of research to respond to the interests of those whose needs are 
the greatest – the poor of the earth – as a result of the inevitable tendency of 
research priorities to reflect the interests of those who pay for science, and the 
interests of scientists themselves. 
21 Every university needs to create a seminar or symposium devoted to the 
sustained discussion of fundamental problems that cut across all conventional 
academic boundaries, global problems of living being included as well as 
problems of knowledge and understanding. 
22. Every national university system needs to include a national shadow 
government, seeking to do, virtually, free of the constraints of power, what the 
actual national government ought to be doing.  The hope would be that virtual 
and actual governments would learn from each other. 
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23. The world’s universities need to include a virtual world government which 
seeks to do what an actual elected world government ought to do, if it existed.  
The virtual world government would also have the task of working out how an 
actual democratically elected world government might be created.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See Gay (1973). 
2 See Maxwell (1984, chs. 2, 3 and 6; or 2nd ed., 2007, chs. 2, 3 and 6). 
3 See Maxwell (1998, pp. 36-45).  
4 See Maxwell (1974; 1984, ch. 9, or 2nd ed., 2007, ch. 9 and 12; 1998, ch. 2; 1999; 
2000; 2004, chs. 1 and 2; 2005; 2010, ch. 5; 2011;  )   
5 For a detailed account of what it means to assert of a physical theory that it is unified, 
including a procedure for grading degrees of unity, see Maxwell (1998, ch. 4; 2004, pp. 
160-174; 1984, 2nd ed., 2007, pp. 373-386). 
6 See works referred to in note 4 and Maxwell (1993; 2002; 2006). 
7 Maxwell (1984, ch. 9, or 2nd ed., 2007, ch. 9 and 12; 1998; 2002; 2004, chs. 1, 2 and 
appendix; 2005; 2006; 2011). 
8 See Maxwell (1977; 1984 or 2nd ed., 2007, ch. 5; 2004, pp. 51-67; 2008). 
9 See Maxwell (2004, pp. 39-47). 
10 Maxwell (1984 or 2nd. ed., 2007, ch. 5; 2004, ch. 3). 
11 See Barnett and Maxwell (2008); Longet-Higgins (1984); Maxwell (1976; 1980; 1984 
or 2nd ed., 2007; 2004, chs. 3 and 4;  2006; 2007; 2012; 2014); McHenry (2009). 
12 See Aron (1968; 1970); Farganis (1993); Hayek (1979); Maxwell (1984, or 2nd 
ed., 2007, ch. 6). 
 
Autobiographical Note 
I have devoted much of my working life to arguing that we need to bring about a 
revolution in academia so that it seeks and promotes wisdom and does not just acquire 
knowledge.  I have published eight books on this theme: What’s Wrong With Science? 
(1976), From Knowledge to Wisdom (Blackwell, 1984), The Comprehensibility of the 
Universe (Oxford University Press, 1998), The Human World in the Physical Universe 
(Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), Is Science Neurotic? (Imperial College Press, 2004), 
Cutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together Again (Pentire Press, 2010: see 
www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom ), How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser 
World: The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution, and Global Philosophy: What 
Philosophy Ought to Be, the latter two published by Imprint Academic in 2014.  I have also 
published many papers on this theme and on such diverse subjects as scientific method, 
the rationality of science, the philosophy of the natural and social sciences, the humanities, 
quantum theory, causation, the mind-body problem, aesthetics, and moral philosophy.  For 
a book about my work see L. McHenry, ed., Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in 
the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell (Ontos Verlag, 2009).  For nearly thirty years I taught 
philosophy of science at University College London, where I am now Emeritus Reader.  In 
2003 I founded Friends of Wisdom, an international group of academics and educationalists 
concerned that universities should seek wisdom and not just acquire knowledge (see 
www.knowledgetowisdom.org).  I have appeared on BBC Radio 4 "Start the Week", and on 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's  "Ideas" Programme. I have lectured in Universities 
and at Conferences all over the UK, in Europe, USA, Canada, and Taiwan.  For more about 
my work see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom .  'Arguing for Wisdom in the 
University', a recent intellectual autobiography published in 2012, and many other articles 
are available online at  http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html . 
 
